Legal Issues

The Current Dog Bite Laws in Georgia

To sustain a dog bite claim in Georgia, a plaintiff must show either that 1) the culprit dog had, on a prior occasion, displayed a propensity to bite, or 2) a local "leash law" was in effect at the time of the incident, and the dog was not properly confined in accordance with the local law. This article discusses current developments in the case law in each of these areas.

Prior Incidents

In 1999, the dog bite law significantly changed, and this change was the first substantial alteration of the law in this area since the dog bite statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, was amended in 1985. The recent change widened the law, rendering summary judgment more difficult to obtain for defendants, and retired the traditional "first bite rule." However, the Court of Appeals only took modest steps away from the traditional law, reflecting a lingering adherance to the requirement that, for liability to attach, a defendant's knowledge of the animal's propensity to bite must be ostensibly demonstrated.

The traditional "first bite rule" holds that one may be held liable for injuries caused by a dog bite only if he or she had prior knowledge that the dog had, on a prior occasion, bitten another human being. See Hamilton v. Walker, 235 Ga. App. 635, 635, 510 S.E.2d 120 (1998); accord Smith v. Culver, 172 Ga. App. 183, 322 S.E. 2d 294 (1984); Rowlette v. Paul, 219 Ga. App. 597, 466 S.E.2d 37 (1995). Evidence that the dog had, on a prior occasion, growled, barked or had otherwise appeared threatening has traditionally been insufficient to sustain a dog bite claim. Hamilton v. Walker, supra ; Durham v. Mooney, 234 Ga. App. 772, 507 S.E. 2d 877 (1998). A "...dog's bark is often worse than its bite," the courts have offered in support of their position. Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254, 255, 251 S.E.2d 88 (1978).

The Court of Appeals cautiously and narrowly expanded the "first bite" rule in Supan v. Griffin, 238 Ga. App. 404, (1999). In Supan, evidence existed that the dog that bit the plaintiff had, on a prior occasion, attacked another dog, and had viciously growled at a neighbor. Evidence also existed that, when the neighbor informed the defendant about the dog's behavior, the defendant replied that the neighbor should "do whatever was necessary ... to keep the dogs from attacking..." Id. at 406. The court held that Defendant Supan's statement raised a genuine issue regarding his prior knowledge of his dog's tendency to attack humans, thereby allowing the case to survive summary judgment. By this holding, the traditional dog bite law was expanded, because the court allowed the claim to survive even though no evidence existed that the dog had, on a prior occasion, actually bitten a person, as the traditional law required.

Although, in Supan, the court did expand the boarders of what evidence could establish that a defendant had prior knowledge of a dog's propensity to bite, the court clearly indicated that it was only somewhat broadening the "first bite" rule. The court's reluctance to greatly depart from the traditional law is demonstrated by the fact that the court based its holding that the defendant's knowledge of the dog's prior act of attacking another dog and growling viciously at the neighbor were, according to the Supan court, still insufficient to establish that the defendant had knowledge of the animal's propensity to bite a human being. It was the defendant's own statement, that the neighbor should "do whatever was necessary to keep the dog[s] from attacking..." that persuaded the court that evidence existed that the defendant had knowledge that the dog might have a tendency to bite a person. Therefore, a defendant's knowledge of his dog's prior "menacing" behavior of growling or barking is still insufficient to sustain a dog bite claim under Supan.

In Thurmond v. Saffo, 238 Ga. App. 687 (1999), rendered a few weeks after the Supan decision, the plaintiff was bitten by the defendants' dog. Evidence existed that prior to the subject dog attack, a neighbor, Brenda Webb, had walked into the Defendants' garage when the dog started walking slowly toward her and barked. Ms. Webb testified that she believed the dog was going to attack her because of the way the dog's eyes and tail looked. Id. at 688. Ms. Webb jumped over the car in the garage to escape from the dog. The dog later bit the plaintiff in the garage. Webb testified that, prior to the incident involving the plaintiff, she told the Defendants that she thought that the dog was going to attack her, and that Ms. Saffo scolded the dog for this behavior. Because Ms. Webb told the defendants prior to the incident that she thought the dog was going to attack her, and because the defendants scolded the dog for this behavior, the court held that evidence existed that the defendants had knowledge of the dog's tendency to attack. In keeping with its digression from the traditional law, the Thurmond court allowed the plaintiff's claim to survive although no evidence existed that the dog had, on a prior occasion, actually bitten another human being, as was customarily required by the traditional law.

In summary, to escape liability for dog bite in Georgia, a defendant may no longer merely assert that there exists no evidence of a prior bite. A defendant must now show that no evidence exists that he or she was on notice that the dog had, on a prior occasion, actually attempted or endeavored to bite another human being. Evidence that a dog displayed "menacing behavior," on a prior occasion, such as mere barking or growling, remains insufficient to sustain a dog bite claim, according to the courts, as held in the surviving cases of Hamilton v. Walker, supra, Durham v. Mooney, supra, and Banks v. Adair, supra. However, the distinctions between these cases and the later cases of Supan v. Griffin and Thurmond v. Sappo are clearly minor.

The courts' decisions in this area are clearly progressing in a plaintiff-friendly direction. A defendant's task is to show that the facts of his or her case are more like the facts in Banks v. Adair and is progeny, rather than like the facts in Supan v. Griffin and Thurmond v. Saffo.

Violation of a Local Leash Law

As established above, a plaintiff must be able to establish that a defendant had prior knowledge that the dog had a propensity to bite. Since the statute which codified the Georgia dog bite law was amended in 1985, the propensity requirement may be abrogated by establishing that the dog was not properly restrained at the time of this incident, in accordance with a local law.

The statute codifying Georgia's dog bite law, O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, states,

"A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, causes injury to another person who does not provoke the injury by his own act may be liable in damages to the person so injured...."

The latter, amended portion of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 states, "...

In proving vicious propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the animal was required to be at heel or on a leash by an ordinance of a city, county, or consolidated government, and the said animal was at the time of the occurrence not at heel or on a leash..."

Therefore, if the evidence shows that the dog was not properly restrained at the time of the incident in accordance with a local law, all hope is not lost for a defendant if the local law allows for less restrictive means of animal confinement than only the requirements of at heel or on a leash.